Network-Based Analysis of Early Pandemic Mitigation Strategies: Solutions, and Future Directions by Hozhabrierdi, Pegah et al.
Northeast Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS) 
Volume 3 
Number 1 Special Issue: NERCCS 2021 Papers Article 3 
March 2021 
Network-Based Analysis of Early Pandemic Mitigation Strategies: 
Solutions, and Future Directions 
Pegah Hozhabrierdi 
Syracuse University, phozhabr@syr.edu 
Raymond Zhu 
Syracuse University, rzhu09@syr.edu 
Maduakolam Onyewu 
Syracuse University, monyewu@syr.edu 
Sucheta Soundarajan 
Syracuse University, susounda@syr.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/nejcs 
 Part of the Data Science Commons, Non-linear Dynamics Commons, Organizational Behavior and 
Theory Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, Systems and Communications Commons, and 
the Theory and Algorithms Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hozhabrierdi, Pegah; Zhu, Raymond; Onyewu, Maduakolam; and Soundarajan, Sucheta (2021) "Network-
Based Analysis of Early Pandemic Mitigation Strategies: Solutions, and Future Directions," Northeast 
Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS): Vol. 3 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
DOI: 10.22191/nejcs/vol3/iss1/3 
Available at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/nejcs/vol3/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Northeast Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS) by an authorized editor of The 
Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu. 
Network-Based Analysis of Early Pandemic Mitigation
Strategies: Solutions, and Future Directions
Pegah Hozhabrierdi†, Raymond Zhu∗, Maduakolam Onyewu∗, and Sucheta
Soundarajan
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY
{phozhabr,rzhu09,monyewu,susounda}@syr.edu
Abstract
Despite the large amount of literature on mitigation strategies for pandemic spread,
in practice, we are still limited by naı̈ve strategies, such as lockdowns, that are not
effective in controlling the spread of the disease in long term. One major reason
behind adopting basic strategies in real-world settings is that, in the early stages of
a pandemic, we lack knowledge of the behavior of a disease, and so cannot tailor a
more sophisticated response. In this study, we design different mitigation strategies
for early stages of a pandemic and perform a comprehensive analysis among them.
We then propose a novel community-based isolation method and show its efficacy in
reducing the speed of the spread by a large margin as compared to current methods.
We also show that the test-trace-isolation strategy can outperform lockdown and
random test-trace in reducing the economic impact and spread of the disease if
combined with k-hop neighborhood ranking. The novelty of our work lies in using
network structural properties (local and global) to design a strategy for the early
stages of a pandemic. Our results encourage further investigation into community-
based mitigation strategies and shed more light on the differences between current
methods of choice in practical setting.
1 Introduction
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments across the world have at-
tempted a variety of strategies to mitigate the spread of disease, including lock-
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relative merits of such strategies; and because these strategies have negative effects
on the economy and the morale of the people, it is critically important to under-
stand their efficacy. Although this work is inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic,
our analysis can apply to any contagious disease. Because the response to a pan-
demic depends on whether it is in the early stages (no vaccination available) or later
stages (vaccination available), we focus on early pandemic mitigation strategies in
correspondence with the COVID-19 situation.
In this work, we analyze variants of the pandemic mitigation strategies practiced
in the real world – e.g. lockdown and test-trace-isolate – from a network perspec-
tive. Inspired by the new psychology findings on the correlation between commu-
nity membership and pandemic response [1, 2, 3], we also offer a community-based
mitigation strategy and demonstrate its efficacy in comparison. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to offer a network-based comparison of practical miti-
gation strategies in the early stages of a pandemic. To evaluate each strategy, unlike
the majority of related work in this field, we consider both the speed of spread and
economic impact as cost factors. For example, a mitigation strategy such as a total
lockdown might have the best performance in terms of controlling the spread of dis-
ease if prolonged for long enough time until the discovery of the vaccine. However,
the devastating economic impacts of such a decision makes this strategy inefficient
in the real world. On the other hand, the “Do Nothing” strategy, which relies on
herd immunity (see Section 3), results in less economic impact (at least in the early
stages), but does nothing about the spread of the disease. An ideal mitigation strat-
egy should offer a trade-off between these two losses. We allocate a budget to each
strategy to count for the economic impact and report both the spread and budget
spent for each strategy simulation.
To ensure that our results are generalizable to other contagious diseases, we en-
force only general assumptions about the nature of the disease and cost of battling
the spread (see Section 2). We use the SIRD epidemic model for our simulations
and only consider the budget spent on isolation strategies. We validate each strat-
egy on a set of 10 real-world social networks (see Section 4.2). To have a close
approximation of human-human contact behavior, these networks are chosen based
on the method of data collection and the meaning of connections between two indi-
viduals. We also consider a set of online social networks that are frequently used in
the disease spread literature [4, 5, 6] and, in some cases, have been shown to give
a close-enough approximation of real-world social networks [5]. Our results show
the superiority of the test-trace-isolation strategy if combined with k-hop neighbor-
hood ranking (specifically for k = 1). We also confirm the theoretical results from
psychology studies on the impact of community membership in reducing the spread
of the disease and show the further direction in adopting such strategies.
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We model the population as a simple undirected graph G(V,E), where individuals
are represented by nodes (V ) and connections between them (E) represent physical
contact. We use undirected edges due to the nature of physical contact, for which a
directed relationship does not bear any meaning. We also consider unweighted and
un-attributed graphs, as attribute information is not easy to gather in a real-world
setting and in the practical strategies discussed below. However, our simulations can
easily be extended to attributed or weighted graphs. For example, the strength of
an edge can be considered as the frequency or length of the contact, where a higher
value increases the probability of infection spread. In the following discussion, we
discuss different models of disease spread and the reasons behind our choice of the
SIRD model. We will also discuss our method of extending the model to count for
the economic impact.
2.1 Viral Spread Modeling
Previous work on mathematical modeling of viral spread can be grouped into two
categories of (1) general spread models and (2) virus-specific spread models. The
former includes famous models such as SIR, SIRD, SIS, SIER, and SIRS [7, 8, 9].
The virus-specific models have been proposed for viruses observed in real world
and consider the specific properties of a certain virus into the modeling of the spread
[10, 11, 12]. The focus of our study is on the effectiveness of different mitigation
strategies for an unknown pandemic scenario (i.e., a pandemic whose specific be-
havior and potential remedies are unknown). It is known that battling a new pan-
demic heavily relies on adopting a proper mitigation strategy in its early stages [13].
In these early stages, our knowledge of the nature of the virus is very limited, and
the virus-specific strategies require prior knowledge gained from time-consuming
clinical trials. Thus, the general models with little to no conditions on virus-specific
behavior are more practically applicable in the early stages of a pandemic. For our
study, we choose the SIRD model due to its minimal assumptions on the nature of
a fatal spread, which is explained below.
2.2 SIRD Epidemic Model
Given a closed community in which the population is fixed (no birth, no migration,
and no death due to causes irrelevant to the disease under study), the SIRD model
assumes four possible states for each individual in the community at each times-
tamp: Suceptible (never contaminated by the virus), Infectious (contaminated and
can spread the virus), Recovered (recovered from contamination and can no longer
3
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spread the virus), and Dead (due to infection). The possible transition between
states and their respective probabilities are depicted in figure 1.




Figure 1: SIRD state transitions. Parameters α, β, and γ indicate infection, recovery, and
mortality rate respectively.
The three parameters of this model are α, β, and γ that indicate infection, re-
covery, and mortality rate respectively. Their exact values used in our simulations
are presented in Table 2 and discussed in Section 4. In Section 4.5, we discuss the
choice of these hyperparameters and validate the robustness of our results for dif-
ferent values of α, β, and γ. We use a discrete-time SIRD model with discretization
period of duration one day. Having initial values S0, I0, R0, D0 in a population of
size N , the virus spread follows these laws of motion:




It+1 = It + α
ItSt
St + It
− (β + γ)It (2)
Rt+1 = Rt + βIt (3)
Dt+1 = Dt + γIt (4)
We assume that no individual can stay in I state indefinitely. As such, every
infectious individual can only stay infected for a certain amount of time (disease
duration in Table 2) and transitions to R if not deceased or recovered already. Note
that we do not consider any delay in the transitions.
2.3 Budget Allocation
The exact modeling of a pandemic’s economic impact is a complicated problem
and requires a comprehensive study on its own [14, 15, 16]. However, we still can
introduce a simplified measure of cost for comparison between different mitigation
strategies. As we try to minimize the number of isolated individuals while reducing
the rate of spread, we have to compensate for the portion of the population that is un-
der quarantine (either compulsorily or voluntarily) to make isolation practical and
possible without threatening the well-being of families and individuals. We treat
this compensation as a required budget for each isolation strategy. Ultimately, an
4
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ideal isolation strategy should use a small compensation budget while minimizing
the peak number of the infectious population over time. A smaller amount of bud-
get spent also indicates isolated individuals, implying less possibility of economic
impact due to work-force perturbation.
3 Mitigation Strategies
Two of the most important problems in the early stages of a pandemic are (1) the
capacity of healthcare centers and (2) economic consequences [14, 15, 16, 17]. An
optimal mitigation strategy seeks to reduce the occupancy of hospitals (lower the
number of infected) while maintaining the productivity of the society to eliminate
economic impacts. However, these two objectives often bear conflicting interests.
So far, the strategies for lowering the number of infected individuals practiced in
real-world setting have negatively affected the economic well-being of the society.
A current example is the Lockdown strategy adopted by many countries (such as
the USA, Spain, and Italy) in 2020 to mitigate the COVID-19 spread1. Interestingly,
lockdown does not offer an optimal solution to either of the objectives above. First,
lockdown leads to a second wave of spread and has to be implemented in several
phases to be effective in lowering the burden on the healthcare system [18]. Sec-
ond, it is shown (both in theory and practice) that lockdown strategy causes severe
damages to the economy [17].
To trade-off between the need for isolation and economic prosperity, [17] sug-
gests employing a Test-Trace-Isolate strategy (TTI). This method puts the focus
on the neighborhood of the individuals with positive test results (infected). Accord-
ing to [19], the countries who employed the TTI strategy against COVID-19 were
able to combat the spread more successfully than those who followed herd immu-
nity2 or full containment (lockdown) strategy. This, however, mainly considers the
medical benefits of the mitigation. The cost-effectiveness of TTI (economical as-
pect) heavily depends on its implementation [20]. For example, how do we choose
whose neighborhood to trace? Is it the people who show symptoms or those who
have tested positive? Furthermore, how many people in the candidate’s neighbor-
hood should we isolate and how big should the size of this neighborhood be? Trac-
ing and isolating steps of TTI are costly and, if implemented in a naı̈ve way, it can
be less efficient than lockdown strategy. In this study, we examine three different
strategies for TTI. These methods all use local neighborhood information. We con-
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_lockdowns
2Herd Immunity is an epidemiological concept and is defined as “the percentage of people with
protective immunity needed in a population to stop the propagation of an infectious agent” [19]. This
strategy, although seemingly giving an optimal solution to economic impact of the spread, results in
a devastating death toll in the population.
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sider random and centrality-based TTI with tracing radius up to k-hops away from
the infected node (for k ∈ {1, 2}). The details of each method are discussed in
Section 4. Note that due to small-world property of social networks, for k values
higher than two, we capture almost all of whole network, which is counter-intuitive
for TTI strategy.
In a pandemic, human behavior plays as important of a role as properties of
the virus (if not a more important role) [1]. Such behavior is directly connected to
psychological traits of individual’s personality [2]. An interesting relevant obser-
vation is that shared community membership increases the speed of the spread [3].
Previous studies have shown there is a correlation between community structure
and spread behavior (e.g., under certain community structure, the spread is slowed
down or sped up) [21, 22]. In a recent study, [23] shows that community size and
density play an important role in the predictability and controllablity of epidemic.
These observations are used in immunization literature to leverage the community
structure for optimizing the immunization plan. For example, in [24], authors pro-
pose a heuristic for finding potential community bridges and immunize them. In
[25], several ranking methods based on the in/out degree of nodes in a community
are proposed to choose a community for immunization.
The immunization is mainly done when enough information is available about
the virus and it is possible to use time-consuming heuristics for finding the op-
timized set of nodes to immunize. Moreover, the immunization is not as costly as
isolation strategies due to the prolonged nature of the latter.The target of our current
study is to act in the early-stages and with limited to no knowledge on the nature
of the disease. We tend to find a balance between lowering the cost and the peak of
infection by using isolation strategies in the absence of vaccines/remedies. We ar-
gue that by considering the findings in the aforementioned studies, we can improve
isolation-based mitigation strategies. As such, we propose a Community-based
Isolation strategy (CI) and show its effectiveness in comparison to lockdown and
TTI strategies. The results of CI are presented to show that using the commu-
nity membership of individuals as an isolation strategy indeed reduces the speed of
spread. At first glance, this method might not be as practical as lockdown or TTI,
owing to the fact that community membership is only partially known and tracing
the memberships can be even more costly that TTI (as shown in Section 4). How-
ever, the results of our experiments show that community-based isolation surpasses
all other methods in reducing the spread of the disease without the disadvantage of a
second wave. We argue that further approximation of community information and
isolation of only bridge nodes (those who contribute the most to the spread from
one community to the next) can improve the cost associated with CI strategy.
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In this section, we evaluate each of the baseline strategies against our proposed
methods. We focus only on real-world data to consider the complex dynamics of
the human-human interaction, which is not entirely captured in synthetic networks
(e.g, stochastic block model, small-world model, etc.).
4.1 Assumptions
As mentioned before, for lockdown and TTI, we do not enforce any disease-specific
information on the model. Additionally, we do not assume the presence of network
structural data that are hard or impossible to obtain in real-world setting. For ex-
ample, we do not assume that we have global information for nodes or edges (e.g.
shortest path-based centralities, diameter of the network, or spectral properties).
We only have the information on the neighborhood of each individual (as obtained
through individual surveys in real world). It is noteworthy that we consider the
neighborhood information to be incomplete and any new information added to our
data will improve the result of the simulations.
For CI, we assume the community membership of individuals is known. In
the real-world, the communities can be considered at different levels; from a club
membership level up to county and state levels. Considering that not all of our
datasets have ground-truth communities, we obtain membership through Louvain
partitioning of the graph that maximizes the modularity.
4.2 Data
Recent studies show the importance of using real-world human-human interaction
data to account for the influence of human behavior in the simulation of a spread
[1]. We chose seven real-world datasets that have been collected based on physi-
cal human interaction/connections in real world. These datasets, although the best
resource for real-world interactions, are generally small due to the cost of data col-
lection. As such, many studies tend to use online social networks as approximate
behavior of the users in physical world. [5] showed that online behavior approxi-
mation for some online networks such as Facebook is close to physical behavior. To
both confirm their results for other online social networks and consider the result
of our simulation on larger networks, we also consider an additional three larger
datasets from online social networks. All of our 10 datasets are chosen based on the
nature of their contact (edge meaning). These datasets and their general statistics
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Data Type Edge Meaning |V | |E| Avg. Deg.
Infectious (INF) Human Interaction Contact 410 2,765 13.49
Hyptertext2009 (HX9) Human Interaction Contact 113 2,196 38.87
Haggle (HAG) Human Interaction Contact 315 2,899 18.41
Adolescent Health (AH) Human Social Friendship 2,539 10,455 8.23
Residence Hall (RH) Human Social Friendship 217 1,839 16.95
Physicians (PHY) Human Social Trust 241 923 7.66
Jazz Musicians (JAZ) Human Social Collaboration 198 2,741 27.69
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Online Contact Interaction 10,680 24,316 4.55
Facebook NIPS (FBN) Online Social Friendship 2,888 2,981 2.06
Hamster Full (HAM) Online Social Friendship 2,426 16,630 13.71
Table 1: Contact datasets for spread simulation
are shown in Table 1. All datasets are publicly available in the Konect repository3
[26].
4.3 Implementation of Mitigation Strategies
In this section, we briefly go over the implementation of each mitigation strategy
mentioned in Section 3. The hyperparameters are the same among all strategies
(such as quarantine compensation, duration of quarantine, duration of disease, and
parameters α, β, γ). These hyperparameters are presented in Table 2. In all sim-
ulations, we start with only one infectious node chosen at random (i.e, I0 = 1,
S0 = |V | − 1, R0 = D0 = 0, unless otherwise specified). For each model, we
repeat the simulation for 100 different starting node and report the average among
the 100 trials. Each round of simulation is run until there are no infected nodes left
in the network. In each timestamp ti, the number of infected, susceptible, and quar-
antined individuals are reported based on the networks status in ti. The reported
proportion of infected individuals is averaged over the timestamps in the simula-
tion. The number of deceased and recovered individuals are reported cumulatively
(from t0 to ti).
• Do Nothing (DN): Although not exactly a mitigation strategy, DN can be
used as the baseline to compare the performance of other methods against it.
It is a simple SIRD model (Equation 1 – 4) that reaches the peak of infection
quickly and fades away quickly as well (due to herd immunity).
• Lockdown: The duration of the lockdown is fixed at 14 days, and it starts
after the detection of the first infectious sample. We randomly choose 90% of
3At the time of writing this paper, we noticed Konect project is discontinued. For obtaining our
dataset, please email the corresponding author.
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Probability of infection (α) 0.2
Probability of recovery (β) 0.08
Probability of death (γ) 0.04
Simulation unit of time 1 day
Disease duration 7 days
Quarantine duration 14 days
Daily quarantine compensation (Compulsory Isolation) $100
Daily quarantine compensation (Volunteer isolation) $50
Volunteer quarantine probability 0.5
Table 2: Hyperparameters chosen for all mitigation strategies when applicable.
the population for lockdown and compensate all of them according to Daily
quarantine compensation (compulsory isolation) in Table 2. After the lock-
down is lifted, the disease spreads according to the SIRD model and we ex-
pect the same peak as in DN but shifted over time. Note that this model adds
a new state Q, for Quarantined, to Figure 1 with Q0 = 0.9|V |, but does not
change the equations.
• TTI:
– K-hop Ranking for k ∈ {1, 2}: Prior to the simulation, each node is
ranked according to the size of its k-hop neighborhood. For example, if
the rank of a node is 16, it means this node, if infectious, can potentially
contaminate 16 other individuals. In the tracing stage of TTI, we choose
to forcibly isolate neighborhood of an infected node who have a rank-
ing above 90 percentile of all rankings in the graph. We also choose
the neighborhood with ranking above 80 percentile (and less than 90
percentile) as candidates to voluntarily quarantine themselves. Both of
these groups (forced quarantine and volunteer quarantine) are compen-
sated but with different amounts (see Daily quarantine compensation
for compulsory and volunteer isolation in Table 2). We assume the can-
didates for volunteer isolation accept the offer 50% of the times. Note
that both of these thresholds can be chosen via trial and error and do not
require global information on the graph.
– Random Ranking: In the tracing stage of TTI, we randomly choose can-
didates from the k-hop neighborhood (k ∈ {1, 2}) of an infected node
to isolate. The isolated nodes are compensated as in lockdown.
• CI: We obtain community memberships through Louvain partitioning [27].
At each timestamp, we isolate an entire community if the portion of infected
9
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nodes within the community is greater than a threshold, i.e. Ic|Vc| > T where
|Vc| is the population within community c and T is a hyperparameter. We
report the results for T ∈ {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}. The isolated members are com-
pensated as in lockdown.
Note that the choice of parameters such as disease duration and quarantine du-
ration does not affect our comparison between Lockdown and TTI strategies as this
parameter is set equally for all of them. In Section 4.5 we show that our compar-
isons are also robust against the choice of α, β, and γ.
4.4 Results & Discussion
The results of the DN, Lockdown, and TTI strategies are shown in Figure 2. In this
figure, the y axis depicts the average (and variance) of the infectious population nor-
malized by the overall population. In all datasets, the best performance is achieved
through the k-hop neighborhood strategy. In 7 out of 10 datasets, the 2-hop strategy
achieves a better performance and, in most cases, it is very close to that of 1-hop.
However, looking at the required budget in Figure 3, it is evident that the choice
of 2-hop neighborhood comes with a greater cost, especially for HX9 dataset. To
understand the reason behind enormous 2-hop budget for HX9, we need to look at
the number of triangles in the network normalized by the maximum possible tri-
angle count (|V |(|V | − 1)(|V | − 2)). In our dataset, HX9 has the highest value
for normalized triangle count (10 times more than the next highest count). Due
to this high clusterability of HX9, the 2-hop neighborhood captures the entirety of
the network and, in practice, gives a less optimal result than lockdown or even DN
strategy in terms of budget. The special case with HX9 dataset shows the limitation
of choosing 2-hop over 1-hop neighborhoods of the infectious nodes. Considering
this trade-off between cost and peak of infection, we can conclude that 1-hop TTI
strategy is the best practical strategy among the rest in real-world scenarios.
As the results for CI-based isolation are threshold-dependent, we have shown
its results separately in Figure 4 and 5 for various threshold values. CI, surprisingly,
does a much better job at reducing the infectious peak than any of the other methods
(compare Figure 4 with Figure 2). This confirms the suggestions from psychology
literature that mitigation strategies based on community membership can result in
a better control over the speed of the spread. However, the thresholding is very im-
portant for CI. As seen in Figure 5, for higher thresholds, CI generally comes with a
much higher budget than TTI, and unlike the previous methods, surpasses the lock-
down budget in many instances. However, keeping the threshold below 0.4 offers
a considerable reduction in speed with a reasonable budget. On the other hand,
we argue that our proposed CI strategy uses limited information and still performs
10
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Figure 2: The average proportion of infected individuals over 100 trials of simulation and its
variance for each mitigation strategy among our datasets. DN, LCKD, and TTI abbreviate
Do Nothing, Lockdown, and Test-Trace-Isolate strategies. TTI suffixes: 1H and 2H repre-
sent k-hop ranking, 1HR and 2HR represent random ranking within k-hop neighborhood.
Best viewed in color.
























Figure 3: The budget spent on isolation strategies. The budget is normalized by lockdown
budget as the baseline. Best viewed in color.
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Figure 4: The average proportion of infected individuals over 100 trials of simulation and
its variance for different thresholds in CI (community-based isolation strategy). The lower
thresholds give considerably better performance than strategies in Figure 2. Best viewed in
color.





























Figure 5: The budget spent on CI for different thresholds. The budget is normalized by
lockdown budget as the baseline. Except for PGP, the budget for lower thresholds among
all datasets are comparable to those in Figure 3. Best viewed in color.
better than other strategies we discussed in reducing the speed. Our CI strategy
only requires the community assignment and the number of infected nodes within
the community. This information is readily available through prior knowledge on
the individual (e.g., the State or County of residence) and the information on the
contagion progress (the [estimate] number of infected individuals). In practice, it is
possible to gain more knowledge on the neighborhood of the infected nodes in the
community (e.g., through contact-tracing and personal questionnaires upon testing)
and use the neighborhood information for targeted isolation.
The special case of PGP. In Figure 5, all datasets follow the same trend that
lower (higher) thresholds demand lower (higher) budget, except for PGP. A closer
look at PGP community structure reveals large communities with high density (i.e.,
12
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community structure that is considerably close to complete graph structure). In
other words, the average path length between nodes in these communities is small
and the virus spreads throughout the community much faster than in other datasets.
As such, PGP meets the isolation threshold in CI much sooner than the rest of the
datasets and forces communities of large size (i.e., containing many nodes) into
quarantine. However, the higher speed of spread means higher number of deceased
as well. As the CI threshold in Figure 5 grows, it becomes harder for PGP to meet
the isolation threshold as many of its members are dead and the CI threshold is
defined over the primary size of the community. Hence, less and less communities
are put into isolation (the decreased budget in Figure 5) and the peak of infection
in Figure 4 matches that of DN in Figure 2. This interesting example shows the
limitation of CI in networks with communities that are close to complete graphs.
For these type of communities, the 1-hop TTI gives the best trade-off between the
peak of infection and budget. However, as is evident from our physical-contact
datasets, the real-world human-human contacts have low-density communities and
obtain better trade-off using CI strategy.
The choice of community. Throughout this study, we have defined community
based on the structural property of the network (e.g., Louvain method). This def-
inition of community expands to real-world communities of people within certain
geographical region (e.g., state, county, city) that have more connection within the
community than outside. However, there are also attribute-based communities that
do not necessarily yield the same structural property. For example, a community
defined based on gender, age, and race is not guaranteed to form communities that
are dense inside and sparsely connected outwards. Just like communities in on-
line social platforms such as Amazon that do not represent human contact for the
modeling purposes of a viral spread, the attribute-based communities may not be a
suitable candidate for our proposed community-based mitigation strategy, CI.
The superiority of CI in mitigating the spread shows that designing an opti-
mal community-based strategy for further alleviation of the economic impact is
a promising research direction. Moreover, community information can be local
and noisy (through individual self-reported or publicly known memberships such
as geographical proximity in a region). Our effort is to encourage more research
on community-based mitigation strategies rather than brute-force methods such as
lockdown or naı̈ve TTI. Although k-hop and community-based methods seem to
require extra effort for tracing the impact, they are still practical in real-world. Our
results show that with local approximation of network’s structure, we still can ob-
tain solutions that reduce both the physical and economic impact of the pandemic
in a global scale.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of peak of infection against probability of infection (α). The changes
in the value of α affects the datasets in a mostly similar way and does not change our
experiment result in Section 4.4. Best viewed in color.





























































Figure 7: Sensitivity of peak of infection against probability of recovery (β). The changes
in the value of β affects the datasets in a mostly similar way and does not change our
experiment result in Section 4.4. Best viewed in color.
4.5 Ablation Study
As mentioned in Section 4.3, our choice of hyperparameters in Table 2 does not
change the result of our comparative study among different mitigation strategies.
Here, we show the robustness of our results against the three degrees of freedom
(α, β, and γ) in SIRD model. We repeat the same experiment in Figure 2 for
different values of these parameters and report the results on peak of infection for
1-hop and 2-hop Test-Trace-Isolate in Figures 6 to 8. The results for other models
were similar and are not included to avoid repetition. As evident from these three
figures, the rate of change in peak of infection is mostly similar across all datasets
and does not change our comparative observations in Section 4.4.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of peak of infection against probability of death (γ). The changes in the
value of γ affects the datasets in a mostly similar way and does not change our experiment
result in Section 4.4. Best viewed in color.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we focused on several mitigation strategies practice in real world
and provided two strategies that can lead to better performance. We showed (1)
The addition of 1-hop neighborhood ranking to TTI can enhance its performance
considerably both in cost and reducing the speed of spread, and (2) community
membership directly influences the speed of spread with a reasonable cost, and is a
promising direction for designing new mitigation strategies. Our results encourage
further research on TTI-based and Community-based methods as powerful tools to
substitute the current naı̈ve solutions to the pandemic mitigation strategies in early
stages.
Future Direction. As discussed earlier, we plan to focus on designing a targeted
community-based mitigation algorithm that incorporates local node information as
well to reduce the quarantine population (and the cost). This information should
be obtainable in practical setting and we count for missing data as well. Another
promising direction is to combine our findings on early mitigation strategies with
strategies adopted for vaccination in later stages of the contagion. The goal would
be to solve an optimization problem that chooses the best vaccination candidates in
order to reduce the cost of adopted isolation strategy. For example, vaccinating cru-
cial nodes in a community can lower the community score ( Ic
Vc
) below the isolation
threshold T and remove the necessity of isolation that community.
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